Many observers have voiced concerns that standards create essentiality and thus monopoly power for the holders of standard essential patents (SEPs). To address these concerns, Lerner and Tirole (2015) advocate structured price commitments, whereby SEP holders commit to the maximum royalty they would charge were their technology included in the standard. We consider a setting in which a technology implementer holds private information about demand. In this setting, price commitments increase efficiency not only by curbing SEP holders' market power, but also by alleviating distortions in the design of the royalty scheme. In the absence of price commitments, the SEP holder distorts the implementer's output downward in the low-demand state to reduce the high-demand type's information rent. Price commitments reduce this distortion.
Introduction
Many observers have voiced concerns that standards create essentiality and thus monopoly power for the holders of standard essential patents (SEPs) (Farrell et al., 2007; Ganglmair et al., 2012; Dewatripont and Legros, 2013; Lerner and Tirole, 2015) . This is said to cause at least two inefficiencies.
First, SEP holders can charge higher royalties than under hypothetical ex ante licensing. Second, anticipating such opportunistic behavior, standard setting organizations (SSOs) may select technologically inferior functionalities that are available at lower royalties, for example because there is within-functionality competition or the patents have expired.
To address these concerns, Lerner and Tirole (2015) advocate structured price commitments, whereby SEP holders commit to the maximum royalty they would charge were their technology included in the standard. 1
In Lerner and Tirole's complete-information setting, price commitments restore the competitive benchmark royalty rates and ensure that the SSO selects the efficient standard. In practice, however, there is often considerable uncertainty about the benefits of including certain functionalities in the standard. In the case of mobile telephony, for instance, it may not be clear how much consumers are willing to pay for increased transmission speeds. Such uncertainty is typically resolved only after the standard has been set. Moreover, technology contributors (SEP holders) tend to be less well informed about demand parameters than implementers of the standard (in the mobile telephony example, the handset makers).
In this paper, we investigate the effects of the kind of price commitments advocated by Lerner and Tirole (2015) in an environment with asymmetric information between upstream and downstream firms. We consider a setting in which the downstream firm holds private information about the demand for the final product incorporating the standard. In such a setting, the upstream firm will design its royalty scheme to screen the downstream firm and elicit its private information (Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo, 1991). 2 We assume that the uncertainty about demand is resolved after the SSO sets the standard but before royalty negotiations between upstream and downstream firm take place.
In the absence of price commitments, the upstream firm screens the downstream firm by means of a non-linear royalty scheme. As usual, the optimal contract involves no distortion of the downstream firm's output in the high-demand state. In the low-demand state, output is distorted downward to make it less attractive for the high type to mimic the low type. This is done in an effort to reduce the downstream firm's information rent. Except for the information rent, the optimal contract extracts the downstream firm's entire surplus. Even though an alternative, albeit inferior, technology is available ex ante, once the standard is set the downstream firm can no longer turn to this alternative technology if it wants to comply with the standard. Because the SSO anticipates the upstream firm's behavior, it often selects the inferior alternative technology as the standard. This is especially bad for welfare if the high-demand state is very likely; that is, of the new technology is very promising.
In the presence of price commitments, the upstream firm can indirectly control the contract that it will offer to the downstream firm after the standard is set by appropriately choosing the royalty cap to which it commits prior to standardization. Essentially, thus, the need to ensure inclusion in the standard adds an additional constraint to the upstream firm's problem.
This forces the upstream firm to leave enough rent to the downstream firm to beat out the alternative technology. We show that a side-effect of this imperative to improve on the alternative technology is to reduce -or even completely eliminate -the distortion of the low type's output. Intuitively, because the upstream firm cannot extract the downstream firm's entire surplus anymore, there is less of a need to reduce the information rent; on the contrary, giving an information rent is an efficient way of transferring some surplus to the downstream firm.
The paper is related to the growing literature on the economics of standard setting. Within that literature, Llanes and Poblete (2014) and Lerner and Tirole (2015) share our focus on ex ante commitments. Llanes (forthcoming) studies a game of repeated standard setting and shows that commitments to license on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms can outperform price commitments when technologies are hard to describe ex ante. Bekkers et al. (2017) model the disclosure process and show that, when there is competition for inclusion in the standard, vertically integrated firms can find it optimal to commit to royalty-free licensing.
For the most part, the literature has ignored asymmetric information about the benefits and costs of technologies vying for inclusion in a standard, which is the focus of our paper. Two exceptions -though different in focus from our paper -are Farrell and Simcoe (2012) and Lerner et al. (2016) . Farrell and Simcoe (2012) model standard setting as a war of attrition where selection occurs through delay. Lerner et al. (2016) study SEP holders' decision whether to make generic or specific disclosures to the SSO. Both papers assume that the quality of technologies, or the patents that cover them, is innovators' private information. By contrast, in our model it is the implementer that holds private information about the demand for a technology.
Our paper also differs from much of the rest of the literature by considering non-linear royalties. Like us, Schmidt (2014) allows for two-part tariffs and shows that, in the context of licensing complementary technologies, they eliminate royalty stacking. In our paper, royalties can be part of the optimal contract despite the fact that we allow for two-part tariffs because they are used for screening purposes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. Section 3 analyzes the case without price commitments, while Section 4 turns to the case in which price commitments, in the form of a royalty cap, are possible. Section 5 concludes.
Model
Consider the following setup. There is a single upstream firm U , a single downstream firm D, and an SSO. U owns a patent on a feature that the SSO considers for inclusion in a standard. There exists an alternative (backstop) technology that is available royalty free and generates a known (inverse) demand P 0 (q). The demand generated by U 's technology is uncertain and governed by a demand parameter θ ∈ {H, L}, such that P H (q) > P L (q) > P 0 (q).
The demand parameter is initially unknown to all parties but is revealed to D prior to the implementation of the standard (in a final product). Assume Pr(θ = L) = λ and Pr(θ = H) = 1 − λ. D has production costs C(q).
The timing is as follows:
1. In the presence of price commitments, U announces the maximum royalty it will chargeR(q).
2. The SSO selects between U 's technology and the alternative one. Assume the SSO is "user-driven" and thus selects the technology that maximizes D's expected profit.
3. If U 's technology is selected, D learns θ. Otherwise, D produces using the backstop technology and earns max q P 0 (q)q − C(q).
U proposes a royalty scheme R(q). If a price commitment is in place,
U is subject to the constraint R(q) ≤R(q). 5. D accepts or rejects. If it accepts, it chooses its output q to maximize
Let π 0 (q) ≡ P 0 (q)q − C(q) denote the downstream firm's profit with the alternative technology. Similarly, let π θ (q) ≡ P θ (q)q − C(q) denote the downstream firm's profit gross of royalties with U 's technology when the demand parameter is θ = L, H. We assume that the profit function is twice continuously differentiable, strictly concave, and has a unique maximum for any demand realization. We let q * θ denote the profit-maximizing output when the demand parameter is θ. In addition, we impose the following assumption:
This assumption says that the change in profit resulting from a marginal expansion of output is larger in the high-demand than in the low-demand state.
To streamline the analysis, we will also assume the following:
This assumption ensures that the optimal contract will not involve shutdown of the low type. For λ close enough to zero it is violated because of Assumption 
subject to individual rationality (IR) and incentive compatibility (IC) constraints,
The following proposition characterizes the solution to U 's problem.
Proposition 1. In the absence of price commitments, U chooses the royalty
Proof. We will solve a relaxed problem, ignoring the high type's IR constraint, (3), and the low type's IC constraint, (4), and then show that the solution to the relaxed problem satisfies these constraints, so that it is also the solution to the original problem. Since the objective is increasing in R L and R H , the constraints (2) and (5) must be binding at the optimum. Hence we can use the constraints to substitute for R L and R H in the objective.
The problem becomes
leading to the first-order conditions
The existence of a strictly positive solution to (7) follows from Assumptions 1 and 2 together with the assumption that π L and π H are continuously differentiable and have unique maximizers.
Next, we show that π H (q L ) > 0, a sufficient condition for which, by strict concavity of π θ and (6), is q L < q H . Suppose otherwise, i.e., q L ≥ q H . Then
, contradicting the assumption that π H (q) > π L (q).
It remains to verify that the constraints that we initially ignored are indeed satisfied. Start from (5):
where the second inequality follows from π H (q L ) ≥ π L (q L ) (which is implied by the assumption that P H (q) ≥ P L (q) for all q) and the last inequality from
(2). Hence, (3) is satisfied.
To check (4), note that the left hand side equals 0. Hence, we have
which, using (5) and (2), can be written as
which holds for q H > q L by Assumption 1.
The allocation in Proposition 1 features the familiar "no distortion at the top" result -the high type produces the efficient output -and a downward distortion of the low type's output, i.e., the low type produces less than the efficient quantity (characterized by π L (q L ) = 0). 4 The intuition is that U can extract D's surplus through the royalty scheme R(q), and thus has an interest in inducing the profit-maximizing output level. The presence of private information, however, allows D to collect an information rent in the high-demand state. To reduce this information rent, U lowers the output level in the low-demand state below the efficient level. This makes it less attractive for the high type to mimic the low type, and thus generates a first-order gain in terms of reducing the information rent in the high-demand state, while (initially) causing only second-order losses in the low-demand state.
The allocation can be implemented by means of a royalty scheme such that R (q N C H ) = 0 and R(q N C
). An example of such a royalty scheme is a menu of two-part tariffs consisting of a fixed fee F and a per-unit royalty r, where (F L ,
. In words, the high type receives a contract that includes only a fixed fee, while the low type receives a contract that includes both a fixed fee and a per-unit royalty.
Standard setting stage. Anticipating the outcome at the royalty-setting stage, the SSO selects U 's technology if and only if it yields D a greater expected profit than the alternative technology. Lettinĝ π 0 ≡ max q π 0 (q), the condition for the SSO to select U 's technology is 
To see that it is always joint-profit maximizing to adopt U 's technology, notice first that since PL(q) > P0(q), we have πL(q * L ) >π0. U could propose a unique contract (q, R) = (q * L , πL(q * L )), which both types would accept. By revealed preference, if U instead proposes the contracts (q N C L , R N C L ) and (q N C H , R N C H ) characterized in Proposition 1, it must be that this yields a higher profit:
which, together with πL(q * L ) >π0, implies (9). A similar argument can be made for the case where it is optimal to shut down the low type.
Price commitments
We now turn to the case where the upstream firm can make price commitments at stage 1. In a first step, we will ignore the royalty setting stage and assume that U can implement any allocation it would like to through the capR(q). Later we show that the allocation U wants to achieve can indeed be implemented through an appropriately chosen cap.
The optimal allocation
Standard setting stage. Let (q L ,q H ,R L ,R H ) denote the allocation that the SSO anticipates will be implemented at the royalty setting stage if U is selected as the standard. The SSO selects U 's technology if and only if
Here, (10) is the constraint imposed by the SSO's selection rule.
Proof. The assumption thatπ 0 > (1 − λ)[π H (q L ) − π L (q L )] implies that the royalty scheme chosen in the absence of price commitments does not permit U to be selected as the standard, and hence that (10) must be binding. Since (14) and (11), together with π H (q) > π L (q), imply that (12) must be slack, the Lagrangian of the problem can be written, using the binding constraint (10) to replaceR L , as
where γ, µ, and η are the multipliers associated with constraints (11), (13),
and (14), respectively. Differentiating (15) with respect toq L ,q H , andR H , respectively, yields the first-order conditions
From (18), we obtain
We now show that (13) and (14) cannot simultaneously be binding, so that either µ = 0 or η = 0. Suppose, by contradiction, that both (13) and (14) hold with equality. Solving both equations forR H −R L then implies
But since, for θ = L, H, (a) µ = 0, (1 − λ)γ = η > 0: that is, (13) is slack while (11) and (14) are binding;
(b) because η = 0 is not compatible with µ > 0, we have γ = µ = η = 0:
that is, (13), (11), and (14) are all slack.
In case (a), we haveR L = π L (q L ) andR H = π H (q H ) − (π H (q L ) − π L (q L )).
Then, by (10),
yields π H (q H ) = 0. In case (b), the first-order conditions (16) and (17) imply π L (q L ) = π H (q H ) = 0.
By assuming thatπ
, Proposition 2 focuses on the case where, in the absence of price commitments, U 's technology would not be selected as the standard. Price commitments allow U to credibly promise lower royalties and thereby ensure the selection of its technology.
As U 's technology is superior to the backstop, this increases efficiency. 6
The proposition also shows that, while the quantity in the high-demand state is unaffected and continues to be set at the efficient level (q C H = q N C H = q * H ), the quantity in the low-demand state is set differently than in the absence of price commitments. The following corollary spells out how.
Corollary. Price commitments reduce the output distortion in the low-
The result is trivial in the case whereq C L = q * L . The more interesting case is whenq C L solves (1 − λ)[π H (q C L ) − π L (q C L )] =π 0 . In that case, the result in the corollary follows from the fact that, by assumption, (1 − λ)[π H (q N C L ) − π L (q N C L )] <π 0 , and that π H (q) − π L (q) is strictly increasing in q due to Assumption 1.
Thus, price commitments alleviate the output distortions caused by information asymmetries. The intuition for this result is that the imperative to ensure selection by the SSO forces U to leave rents to D. As a result, U has less of an incentive to lower the high type's information rent by distorting the low type's output.
Implementing the allocation through the royalty cap
We now show that U can implement the allocation derived in Proposition 2 by means of an appropriately chosen royalty capR(q). At the royalty setting stage (stage 4), the upstream firm's problem can be written as
subject to the following constraints: 
Thus, designingR such thatR (q C L ) = 0 leads U to choose q L =q C L and q H =q C H = q * H . If instead (27) Thus, designingR such thatR (q C L ) = (1 − λ)π H (q C L ) leads U to choose q L =q C L and q H =q C H = q * H .
By appropriately choosingR(q) at stage 1, the upstream firm can indirectly control the quantity q L that it will implement at stage 4, while q H will be set at the profit-maximizing level.
Conclusion
This paper analyzes the role of price commitments in the standard-setting process when there is asymmetric information between upstream and downstream firms. Specifically, we assume that the downstream firm is privately informed about the demand for the upstream firm's technology. In the absence of price commitments, the upstream firm designs its royalty scheme to elicit the downstream firm's private information. To reduce the downstream firm's information rent, the upstream firm distorts output away from the efficient level in the low-demand state. Moreover, because royalties are negotiated after the standard has been set, the upstream firm cannot commit to leave the downstream firm better off than with an inferior alternative technology that is available royalty free. Anticipating this opportunistic behavior, a user-friendly SSO often refrains from selecting the upstream firm's technology despite its technological superiority.
Price commitments allow the upstream firm to commit not to behave opportunistically after being selected as the standard. An interesting sideeffect of this is that it curbs the incentive for the upstream firm to distort the downstream firm's output. In fact, convincing the SSO to select the upstream firm's technology requires leaving enough surplus to the downstream firm, and giving information rents to the high type is a relatively cheap way of doing so. As a result, price commitments reduce output distortions and ensure that the superior technology is selected as the standard.
